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Various variables have been explored in relation to the judgment of 
.social stimuli. 
The available literature is not in complete agreement on the manner 
in which these variables affect the judgment of social stimuli. One 
relevant variable is that.of cognitive sophistication. Although there 
is agreement that different individuals have differences in "cognitive 
style," there is disagreement as to its basis and function (Bruner & 
Tajfel, 1965a: Gardner & Schoes, 1965: Bruner & Tajfel, 1965b). 
Upshaw (1965) in discussing the differences in cognitive style of 
"broad" and "narrow" categorizers suggests that the "sophisticated judge 
with a broad view makes·less fine distinctions than does his provincial 
counterpart among elements which they both consider (p. 63)," The 
findings of Leventhal and Singer (1964) indicate that individuals of 
differing cognitive complexity tend to be differentially sensitive to 
informational content. Tripodi and Bieri (1966) found that cognitively 
complex subjects tend to conceptualize the interpersonal world in more 
elaborate terms.than.less sophisticated subjects. Zajonc (1968), in 
reviewing the available literature, concludes that the ways in which 
individuals organize the world about them differs, but that the 
systematic basis for this is not clear. 
With regard to the stimulus dimension, a study by Sherif, C (1951) 
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is relevant. Indian and white children performed differently when the 
test items were changed from digits preceded by dollar signs (simple) to 
statements of socially valued items (complex). The results of the study 
I 
revealed that the white children performed slightly better in the simple 
situation and significantly better in the complex situation. These 
findingswould seem to infer that subjects who do not have the same 
background of exp'erience will perform differently comparing complex 
items to simple items. Osler & Trautman (1961) and Wolff (1967) have 
shown that increasing the stimulus complexity of the.same meaning domain 
has differential effects on concept attainment and utilization although 
the nature of these effects has not.been definitively ascertained. 
Sherif and Hovland. ( 1952), Sherif & Hovland ( 1961), and Sherif, 
Sherif, and Nebergall (1965) all have employed the "own category" 
technique for data collection. In 1952, Sherif and Hovland outlined 
the importance of the "own category" technique in attitude assessment: 
"An individual's tendency to adopt a constricted 
extended scale and his characteristic pattern for distributing 
items within the scale may indirectly.reveal the individual's 
attitude more clearly than· the answers given to standard 
attitude scale items when one is conscious of the possible 
interpretation by others of each item he answers (ch. 
Campbell's (1950). discussion of "disguised-Structured" 
methods of indirect attitude assessment)." page 1. 
Based on this earlier work of Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall (1965) 
postulated the following in relation to research conducted in relation 
to the 1960 presidential electioni 
A. If a person has an attitude toward the stimulus domain, 
his judgments of specific objects in that domain are to 
some extent, relative to the categories of his own 
reference·scale, in addition to the context of immediate 
and preceding stimulation. 
B. To the extent that the domain has.high priority in his 
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scheme of personal relatedness with his social world, his 
latitt,1.de of acceptance.becomes.an anchor or standard for 
his placement of other items in the domain. In other 
words, the range of positions acceptable to him becomes an 
anchor proportioni;il to his personal involvement in 
upholding it. 
C, To the extent that his own position becomes·the most 
salient anchor in the situation, the individual's 
categorization of items is evaluation of the items. There 
is now a considerable body of research supporting this 
statement (Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall 1965), Even when 
instructed to heed only the stimulus attributes of the 
items and categorize them on an impersonal dimension, the 
highly involved individual performs the task in terms of 
~is agreements-disagreements with the items, including his 
assessments of their truth and falsity, One may · 
temporarily force him to follow insturctions by insisting 
that he compare one item with another, as in the method of 
paired comparisons, He can discriminate among the items 
but, barring special arrangements requiring him to do so, 
he simply does not divorce the task of judging the items 
from his evaluations of them. · · 
D. When his own stand is the anchor, other items will be 
displaced toward his acceptable category (assimilation) or 
away f:t'om it (contrast), proportional to their proximity 
or difference from his own stand. The additional, 
necessary condition for these systematic displacements is 
that the objects lack, in some degree, objective 
properties which are readiJ,.y and uniformly perceived as 
defining membership in a particular category. For 
example, strongly worded statements of an extreme position 
on a social issue are not displaced systematically to any 
significant degree. These are readily identified as 
extreme positions in terms of the prevailing social 
realities. Systematic displacements are found, however, 
for less extreme and intermediate positions on the same 
issues. (Sherif, C., Page 357). 
A consistent finding using this technique has been the tendency of 
ego-involved individuals holding an extreme attitude to see things in 
"black" and "white." Sherif and Hovland expressed the results of their 
work in these terms: " ... highly involved persons, judging these 
statements in terms of their favorableness-unfavorableness to negroes, 
produced bimodal distributions of the statemtnts into categories. 
Intermediate categories were neglected while disportinate numbers of 
i terns were placed in the extreme cat_egory fartherest removed from the 
position the individual found most acceptable." 
Atkins, Deaux, and Bieri (1967) and Ostrom (196q) have called for 
the exploration of variables other than ego-involvement and/or extreme 
attitude in relation to the dynamics of social ju_dgment and attitude 
change~ While_extremity of attitude.and ego-involvement can be·shown 
to be independent (Ward, 1965), they are usually concomittant. 
Developmental level (_age) , intell_igence and education are reL;;1.ted to 
concept availability and utilization (e.g., Denny, 1966: Stone, 1968: 
Davey, 1968). 
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This work explored the "own-cat_egory" ju_dgment of social stimuli by 
c_ognitively sophisticated and c_ognitively naive individuals of pro, 
neutral, and anti attitudes in relation to two sets of stimuli, simple. 
·and complex. The main purpose was to explore variables other than 
extremity~involvement as they may affect the ju_dgment process--
specifically, cognitive complex~ty and stimulus complexity--as well as 
to collect more. evidence towards the saliency or non-saliency of the 
extremity-involvement factor, 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD AND PROCEDURE 
Subjects. 
Ninety four male subjects were employed in the experiment, forty 
of the subjects were individuals holding the Ph.D. (cogpitive complex, 
CC) and 54 were individuals who were freshmen at Oklahoma State 
University. Subjects holding the Ph.D. were staff at Oklahoma State 
University. Subjects were classified as pro (P), peutral (N), or anti 
(A) with respect to their attitude about the subject of the test 
instrument, This was.done by a method independent of the "own-category" 
items, by having the .. subject give a written statement as to his position. 
Subjects were then arranged in the following manner: CCP-12 subjects; 
CCN-'.1,4 subjects; CCA-14 subjects; CSP-19 subjects; CSN-20 subjects; 
CSA-15 subjects. 
Stimulus Material 
Stimulus material consisted of two sets of 28 statements concerning 
the social use of alcohol. One set consisted of stimulus-simple (SS) 
items and the other set consisted of stimulus-complex (SC) items, The 
28 SS items had previously been shown to be reliably capable of 
placement on a 7 point continum (1-7) ranging from anti to pro by 
neutral judges operating under an objective instruc;:tional set. Sets of 
4 statements defined each of the 7 continum points. A parallel set of 
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items of equivalent meaning but greater conceptual elaboration was· 
generated. A panel of 3 Ph.D.'s unfamiliar with the nature and purpose 
of the experiment compared the appropriate pairs of stimulus statements 
for semantic equivalence and relative complexity. In all instances, SC 
items as compared to SS items were equal in meaning while more elaborate 
conceptually. Of the CC subjects, 17 were exposed to the SS series and 
23 were exposed to the SC sex>ies while 28 of the CS subjects were 
exposed to the SS series and 26 to the SC series. 
All subjects were run on an individual basis. The data was 
collected in a room set aside for the experiment. The subject was 
brought into the room and asked to be.seated facing the experimenter. 
The subject was then given a deck of three by five cards on which the. 
stimulus items were prd,nted. The followi.ng instructions were then 
presented vex>bally: "You have before you items which are statements 
concernlng the social use of alcohol. Categorize these statements, 
putti.ng the pro alcohol statements to your r.ight. and the anti alcohol 
statements to your left, Make as many piles as you wish. Always put 
the statements you feel belong t.ogether in the same· pile." The 
instructions were repeated. Any question relevant to the task was. 
answered prior to the start of the judgment of the items. After the 
subject had sox>ted the items into as many piles as he felt was needed he 
was asked to verbally tell the experimenter what pile(s) was the most 
acceptable to him. He was asked then to state which pile(s) was the 
most unacceptable. Following this the subject was asked to state those 
piles that he found acceptable and those that he found unacceptable. 
The last stage of the experiTJ1ent required the subject to write a 
statement about his position concerning the social use of alcohol and 
make a mark indicating his position along a 6 inch line which was 
marked pro on the end to the subject's left and anti to the subject's 





As a check on the validity of the statement and line basis for 
assigning a subject to the P, N, or A sample population and the 
reliability of the stimulus items, most acceptable category (MA) mean 
values were examined. Own attitude (P, N, A) main effects were 
significant beyond the .001 level, F (2,82)=107.02, Mean values of P, 
N, and A subjects were 5,29, 3.95, and 2.21; Based on the continum 
used in the experiment in which 7.00 represents an extreme pro positi9n, 
1.00 represents an extreme anti position and 4.00 represents a neutral 
or indifferent position, the independent data on own position (MA 
category) lend credibility to the validity of the line and statement and 
the reliability of the discriminability and ranl<-orderability of the 
stimulus statements. 
· A crucial dependent measure is. the number of categories utilized 
by subjects in their judgmental organization of the stimulus statements. 
Table I summarizes these effects. CC Subjects averaged 6,82·categories · 
and CS subjects utilized a mean of.4.32 categories in judging the 
statements. The mean number of categories utilized by own attitude 
were: P = 6,05, N = 6.59, A= 4.06. 
Differences in the number of stimulus statements falling into the 
MA category were significant for cognitive comp],exity, F(1,82)=4.96, 
p .05 and attitude, F(2,82)=3.74, p .05. Mean values for the cognitive 
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complexity variable were CC= 5.53 and CS= 7.36, while mean values for 
attitude wer,e P = 5.98, N = 5.36, A= 7.99. The number of stimulus 
statements falling into the most unacceptable category (MUA) were 
significant for attitude, f'(2,82)::: 8.89, p ,0005 with mean values 
P::: 5;28, N::: 5,27, A= 9.89. 
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Table II summarizes the number of category differences for 
latitudes of acceptance and Table III summarizes the number of category 
differences for latitudes of rejection. Only attitude main effects were 
significant for the number of categories in the latitude of acceptance 
with mean values of P = 2.42, N = 2.35, A= L47. The number of 
category differences for.the latitude of rejection approached 
significance for the cognitive complexity variable with mean values of 
CC= 2.14 and CS::: 1,63; 
The analysis of variance for the number· of stimulus statements 
utilized within the latitude of acceptance was significant for cognitive 
complexity F(1,62) = 11.68, p .005 with mean values of CC = 9.55 and 
cs::: 13,11. 
The number of stimulus statements utilized within latitudes of 
riejection was significant for attitude, f(2,82) = 4.47, p .025, with 
mean values of P = 11.71, N = 9.55, and A= 13.27. 
Tables IV and V summarize the analysis of variance of category 
utilization for latitudes of noncommitment and stimulus statement 
utilization within those latitudei;;. Mean values for number of 
categories utilized for latitudes of noncommitment were C = 2.48 and 
CS= 0.70, while mean values for the.number of noncommitment were 
CC= 7.38 and CS= 2.91. 
Table VJ through Table X give a detailed breakdown of the number of 
items falli_ng l~~to the MA category (Table VI), the MUA category (Table 
\. 
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VII), the number of items falli_ng into the latitude of rejection (Table 
VIII), the number of items fallinto the latitude of acceptance (Table IX) 
and the number of items falling into the latitude of indifference (Table 
X). 
CHAPTER IV 
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
Summary and Conclusions 
All significant results were due to main effects,. Interaction 
effects did not approach significance, The dominant finding of thi,s 
study is the importance of the level of cognitive sophisticatioI). in the 
judgment of social stimuli. This is in keeping with the work of 
Gardner & Schoen (1965), aruner & Tajfel (1965a, 1965b), Upshaw (1965), 
Leventhal & Singer (1964), Zajonc (1968), Tripodi & Bieri (1966), in 
that it supports the notion that a relatively high level of education 
and intelligence results in a "narrow categorizer" cognitive style, 
This·is directly borne out by the highly significant tendency of Ph,D.s 
to use more categories as compared to their more unsophisticated 
counterparts when exposec:l to the same set of stimuli. Cognitively 
sophisticated subjects as compared to cognitively naive subjects also 
accepted fewer stimulus statements into the most acceptable category 
and fewer stimulus statements into the latitude of acceptance, Of 
particular interest in addition is the fact that cognitively 
sophisticated subjects as compared to naive subjects were much more 
inclined to establish a latitude of noncommitment (mean number of 
categories CC= 2.48, CS 0,70) and to relegate a significant number of 
items to their latitude of noncommitment. This suggests that educated 
and intelligent people tend to use not only restrictive or narrow 
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categories of judgment but to: gene:('ate ju_d~mental categories that are 
outside their latitudes of acceptance or rejection. From another 
standpoint this · can be interpreted as a tolerance. for amb_igui ty .and a 
capacity for subtle social stimulus differentiation that is not subject 
to an overriding need for structuredness which .would "force" amb_iguous 
. I 
items into the latitude of acceptance or rejection. 
The two le_vels of stimulus complexity were not. signi;ficant for any 
of the dependent variables. This may have been the effect of two 
factors. First, the complexity of tti.e stimulus items may have been such 
that differentiation was not s_ignificant. Second, the sample from which 
this data was drawn appeared to be non-normal for the cell of data that 
served to neutralize .the significance of the .stimulus complexity 
dimension. In all probability future research will find that stimulus 
complexity is indeed a significant :!;'actor. 
In general, the relevance of attitudinal factors in terms of 
extremeness and ego-involvement in influencing social judgment was 
supported. The anti subjects were particularly responsible for 
establishing respectable significance levels~- a findi_ng consistent with 
the .qualitative nature of the written statements wherie stro.ng la_ngu_age 
suggested _ego-involvement in the A position. Non-neutral subjects used 
fewer cat_egories than neutral subj ect,s with a greater number of items 
falli_ng into the most acceptable cat_egory. In addition non-neutral 
subjects piled up more.items in the l~titude of rejection than did 
neutral subjects. The extremeness ... involvement judgment model was· 
partially confirmed by the dependent variable of number. of cat_egories in 
the latitude of acceptance. Anti·subjects used fewer categories than N 
subjects, but P subjects recorded a sl.ightly higher value than a 
subjects. Another significant effect for attitude, that of number of 
items in the most acceptable category, ran counter to the 
extremeness-involvement expectation. Non-neutral subjects utilized 
more items than neutral subjects. While this is explainable as a 
function of the arithmetic of broad categorization which il:l itself a 
dependent effect of attitude, the A subjects in particular from the 
standpoint of an extremeness-involvement model should have recorded 
fewer items than the P subjects (if not the N subjects) as a function 
of greater MA category item selectivity. 
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This research indicated that cognitive sophistication is probably 
as important as attitude extremeness and involvement in determining the 
nature of social stimulus jqdgment effects. While extremeness of 
attitude and ego-involvement tend to result in seei_ng things in "black 
and white," increasing the level of cognitive sophistication seems to 
oppose such effects. From the standpoint of cognitive style, it appears 
that increasing the variable(s) of extremeness-involvement results in a 
"broad categorizer" and tha.t increasing the variable of cognitive 
complexity results in a "nar>row cat_egorizer." 
Implications for Future Research 
An obvious implication of this research is that researchers in the 
future must attend carefully to the manner in which the results of the 
"own catergory" technique are interpreted. This should be done with the 
knowledge that the placement of items may well be a function of factors 
other than simply the individual's own position in relation to the 
attitude being studied. The subject population dictates the manner in 
which the scale is judged. A person with a high ego-involvement in his 
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position and little education may perform quite differently as compared 
to his educated counterpart, even though involvement level and attitude 
are quite similar. Results should be interpreted with cognitive 
complexity, stimulus complexity, and attitude factors taken into 
account. 
The manner in which the "own category" technique is given is 
basically a test of the verbal ability of the subject. The higher the 
degree of verbal ability of the subject the higher will be the degree of 
differentiation of the stimulus items. This is demonstrated by the fact 
that freshman subjects on the average used fewer categories than did 
their Ph,D. counterparts. In some instances however this was not true 
as some freshman subjects used more categories than did some Ph.D. 
subjects, all with the same experimental block. This points to the 
important fact that the selection of the subject population in relation 
to the cognitive complexity factor may not be possible along the lines 
of a simple dichotomy. It may well be that pre-testing or addition of 
the verbal ability variable into the experimental design maybe 
necessary, Several levels of cognitive complexity could be usefully 
established in a factorial de5ign where cognitive complexity was to be 
investigated in relation to other independent variables, 
The .control of cognitive complexity should enable the experimenter 
to maximize the efficiencyof datc;3. gathering using the "own category" 
procedure and to more effectively e;i{plore other· fi;ictors affecting social 
judgment, 
The stimulus complexity variable should thus be more fully 
differentiated into categories of simple and complex to see if the lack 
of significance obtained in this study is spurious or ba.sic. 
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR NUMBER 
OF CATEGORY UTILIZATION 
Source of variation MS de 
Cognitive complexity 
Stimulus complexity 
Attitude ( c) 
A x B 
A x c 
B x c 
A x B 




(A) 138.62 1 

















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR NUMBER OF CATEGORlES UTILIZED 
IN LATITUDE OF ACCE.PTANCE 
Source of variation MS df F 
Cognitive complexity (A) 0. 77 1 Oo64 
Stimulus complexity (B) 1.55 1 1.30 
Attitude (C) 8.33 2 6,99** 
A x B 1.87 1 1.57 
A x C 1.97 2 1.65 
B x C 2.64 2 2.22 
A x B x c 2.33 2 1,95 
Error 1.19 82 
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TABLE IJ;I 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR NUMBER OF CATEGORIES UTILIZED 
IN LATITUDE OF REJECTION 
Source of variation MS df 
Cognitive complexity (A) 5.74 1 
Stimulus complexity (B) 0.20 1 
Attitude (C) 4.00 2 
A x B 0.61 1 
A x c 0.12 2 
B x c 2.35 2 
A x B x c 2.60 2-











ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR NUMBER OF CATEGORIES IN 
LAT+TUDE OF NONCOMMITTMENT 
Source of variation MS df 
Cognitive complexity (A) 70,39 1 
Stimulus complexity (B) 21.00 1 
Attitude (C) 10.91 2 
A x B 24.89 1 
A x c 13.92 2 
B x c 4.44 2 
A x B x c 4.23 2 











ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR STIMULUS STATEMENT UTILIZATION 
WITHIN NONCOMMITTMENT LATITUDE 
Source of variation MS df F 
Cognitive complexity (A) 443.77 1 14. 61~h': 
Stimulus complexity (B) 10.02 · 1 0.33 
Attitude (C) 65.77 2 2.16 
A x B 111.27 1 3.66 
A x C 47.90 2 1.58 
B x C 65.13 2 2.14 
AxB x c 42.73 2 1.41 
E;rror 30.38 82 




THE NUMBER OF ITEMS IN THE MA CATEGOR,Y AS DEfINED BY 
THE TREATMENT COMBINATION MATRIX 
Combination XBAR N 
CSP-E 5.400 5.000 
CSN-E 4.000 7.000 
CSA-E 7.800 5.000 
CCP-E 4. 714 7.000 
CCN-E 5.143 7.000 
CCA-E 6~111 9.000 
CSP-N 6.900 10.000 
CSN-N 7.600 10.000 
CSA-N 8.625 8.000 
CCP-N 6.889 9.000 
CCN-N 4.700 10.000 






























THE NUMBER OF ITEMS IN THE NUA CATEGORY AS DEFINED 





























THE NUMBER OF CATEGORIES IN THE LATITUDE OF REJECTION AS 
DEFINED BY THE TREATMENT COMBINATION MATRIX 
Treatment 
Combinat;l.on XBAR N SD 
CSP-E 1.800 5.000 1.167 
CSN'-E 2.429 7.000 2.195 
CSA-E 1.800 5.000 1.167 
CCP-E 3.286 7.000 1.161 
CCN-E 1.857 7.000 1.125 
CCA-E 1.667 9.000 0.943 
CSP-N 1.900 10.000 1.136 
CSN-N 1,600 10,000 1.114 
CSA-N 1.500 8.000 0.707 
CCP-E 1.889 9.000 1.197 
·ccN-N 1.900 10.000 1.513 




THE NUMBER OF CATEGORIES IN THE LATITUDE OF AC.CEPTANCE 
AS DEFINED BY THE TREATMENT COMBINATION MATRIX 
Combination XBAR N 
CSP-E 1.800 5.000 
CSN-E 2.286 7.000 
CSA-E 1.600 5,000 
CCP-E 3.571 7.000 
CCN-E 2.000 7.000 
CCA-E 1.778 9.000 
CSP-N 2.100 10.000 
CSN-N 2.400 10.000 
CSA-N 1.500 8.000 
CCP-N 2,222 9.000 
CCN-N 2,700 10.000 
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